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Underwriting and Investment Risks in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: 
Evidence Prior to the 9-11 Event 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Underwriting and investment are two important and related business activities of insurance 
companies. However, studies on the interrelation between underwriting and investment risks of 
Property-Liability (P-L) insurance companies are sparse in the literature. Using a sample of U.S. 
P-L insurers, this article conducts an empirical investigation of how these two risks are 
associated with each other in the 1994-2000 period (before the September 11th terrorist attack in 
2001). Our results, robust to various estimations, suggest that there is no significant relationship 
between the underwriting and investment risks among our sample firms. Such results based on 
pre 9-11 event period provide some support for the conjecture of Achleitner et al. (2002) that 
many insurance companies may have failed to take an integrated approach to risk management 
and so suffered a heavy loss due to dual exposures in both underwriting and investment in the 9-
11 event. In the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, risk taking and risk management 
of financial institutions have received more attention and increasing scrutiny. We believe the 
current paper provides some useful insights in this vein. 
 
 
Keywords: Underwriting risk; Investment risk; Risk-taking; P-L insurers 
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Underwriting and Investment Risks in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: 
Evidence Prior to the 9-11 Event 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A firm’s risk-taking behavior has aroused numerous research interests because it 
concerns the financial interests of various corporate stakeholders. This is particularly germane in 
financial industries where the protection of depositors and/or policyholders is always of the 
paramount concern.1 In this article, we investigate the interrelation between underwriting and 
investment risks of property-liability insurers’ (P-L insurers). Though underwriting and 
investment are the two primary and related business activities of an insurer (Adams, 1999; 
Adams and Buckle, 2003), the interrelation between underwriting and investment risks for P-L 
insurers has not been rigorously examined in the literature.2 
To our best knowledge, Hammond, Melander and Shilling (1976) is the only study that 
provides a direct test of the relation between underwriting and investment risks in the P-L 
insurance industry. They regress underwriting risk (measured by the ratio of net premiums to 
equity) on investment risks (proxied by standard deviation of investment returns to invested 
assets or the proportion of equity investment) of 26 P-L insurers for the period 1952-1967 and 
document a negative relation. They conclude that P-L insurance managers may choose an overall 
                                                 
1 Prior studies on the risk-taking behavior of financial institutions (e.g., banks and insurance companies) mainly 
go along three lines. First, one line focuses on the relation between risk-taking behavior and ownership structures of 
financial institutions. Studies (e.g., Saunders, Strock and Travlos, 1990; Downs and Sommer, 1999; Chen, Steiner 
and White, 2001) have examined the effect of managerial ownership on risk taking. Lamm-Tennant and Starks 
(1993) compare the underwriting risk of stock and mutual P-L insurers and report that stock insurers tend to exhibit 
a higher underwriting risk than do mutual firms. A second line examines whether franchise value of financial 
institutions can mitigate excessive risk-taking (e.g., Keeley, 1990; Staking and Babbel, 1995; Demestz, Saidenberg 
and Strahan, 1996; Saunders and Wilson, 2001). A third line investigates the relation between capital and overall 
risk-profile of insurers (e.g., Cummins and Sommer, 1996; Baranoff and Sager, 2002).  
2  Prior insurance-related studies use various terminologies to describe insurance firms’ major risks – for 
example, assets/investment risks and liabilities/product/underwriting risks. In the current study, we adopt the terms 
of underwriting and investment risks. 
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desired level of risk by trading off underwriting risk against investment risk. However, their 
univariate analysis fails to control for any relevant factors of underwriting risk and their 
underwriting risk measure is also crude (and similar to the Kenney ratio and thus essentially a 
measure of underwriting capacity). Our study bridges this gap by examining not only the effects 
of investment risk on underwriting risk, but also the effects of underwriting risk on investment 
risk by controlling the exogenous factors. 
Our study is also motivated by the article by Achleitner, Biebel and Wichels (2002) in 
which they report that some big insurers (e.g., Allianz3) suffered a heavy loss because of a dual 
exposure to aviation industry risk (i.e., on both the underwriting and investment sides) caused by 
the September 11th terrorist attack (hereafter the “9-11 event”). They conjecture that the 
insurance industry may have neglected or underestimated the correlation between underwriting 
and investment risks and may have largely taken a silo approach in managing the risk of 
underwriting and investment activities. We conduct an analysis specifically based on a sample 
period prior to the 9-11 event to exclude the confounding effects from that event year and the 
post-event effects.4 Therefore, we believe that our rigorous examination can shed light on the 
relationship between insurers’ underwriting and investment risks. Thus the evidence on the 
linkage between insurers’ underwriting and investment risks should be of significant interest to 
regulators, investors, policyholders and insurance managers. Especially when enterprise risk 
management becomes more prevalent in insurance industry, an integrated risk management on 
both underwriting and investment risks is even more important than ever.    
                                                 
3 For example, Achleitner et al. (2002) report that the Allianz Group suffered a loss of more than 4 billion Euros 
in its investments in the initial several days following the attack on the WTC and incurred liabilities of 1.5 billion 
Euros while the significant underwriting loss was expected. 
4 Due to data limitation, we leave the effect of the 9-11 event on the relation between underwriting and 
investment risks as an interesting question for future research.  
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Our study is also related to two prior studies. Cummins and Sommer (1996) treat the 
underwriting and investment activities of (stock) P-L insurance firms as a portfolio of two funds 
and calculate an aggregate risk measure by taking account of the covariance between the 
underwriting and investment returns. They report a positive relationship between stock P-L 
insurers’ capital and the aggregate risk proxy. Our investigation of the interrelation between the 
two core risks complements their work and contributes to the understanding of the dynamics 
between underwriting and investment risks. 
Baranoff and Sager (2002) examine the capital-risk relation in the life insurance industry 
and their simultaneous equations include two specifications of underwriting (proxied by the 
proportion of health insurance business) and investment risks (a regulatory-based asset risk 
measure). Their results suggest a positive two-way linkage between the underwriting and 
investment risks for life insurers despite no interpretation offered in their paper. Given the well 
recognized significant differences between life and P-L insurance businesses5, it is necessary to 
examine the linkage between underwriting and investment risks separately for P-L insurers.  
Another contribution of our study is that we use a large sample of both stock and mutual 
insurance firms (581 firms), while prior studies typically use data on stock insurers. We believe 
that the inclusion of mutual firms is important given that in the insurance industry (e.g., of the 
U.S.), a large proportion of insurance firms is represented by mutual firms for which there is no 
                                                 
5 P-L and life insurers tend to differ in their earnings mix (i.e., with P-L insurers’ profit relying more on 
investment income) and the investment of P-L tends to be riskier. For example, Hammond and Shilling (1978) and 
Fairley (1979) report that many P-L insurers have zero or negative underwriting profit and rely on investment 
income for profit. In contrast, Boose (1993) notes that only about one-third of life insurers’ profit is typically 
derived from investment income. In addition, while life insurance’s underwriting function is reasonably predictable 
(thank to the use of mortality table), the occurrence of P-L insurance claims is largely uncertain and stochastic. 
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market-based data available. As such, our study provides new insights into the risk-taking 
behavior of both types of P-L insurance firms.  
Following a target expected return that consists of underwriting and investment returns 
(Fairley, 1979), insurers are likely to control their overall insolvency risk by simultaneously 
adjusting their underwriting and investment risks. In the current study, we put forth two possible 
linkages between the underwriting and investment risks of P-L insurers – namely, the trade-off 
and co-movement hypothesis, respectively. The trade-off hypothesis posits that P-L insurers trade 
off underwriting (investment) risk against investment (underwriting) risk when their total risk 
level is approaching the maximum tolerant level. In contrast, the co-movement hypothesis is 
based upon two rationales. First, in case where the total risk level is distant from the maximum 
tolerant level (e.g., we term this as “having extra risk capacity” hereafter), insurers may 
simultaneously increase both underwriting and investment risks. In addition, some catastrophes 
may concomitantly cause shocks to P-L insurers’ underwriting and investment sides, thereby 
potentially introducing a positive relation between underwriting and investment risks (Achleitner 
et al., 2002). Second, a high (low) investment risk is likely to result in a more (less) volatile 
surplus and underwriting capacity, which can then increase (decrease) the fluctuations in 
insurance premium rates and underwriting profit. However, we believe these two hypotheses are 
not mutually exclusive and both could contribute to the relation between a P-L insurer’s 
underwriting and investment risks.  
Measuring underwriting risk as the combined ratio and investment risk as the proportion 
of investments in common stocks, we find no significant support for either of the arguments. Our 
result is thus different from the finding that insurers tend to trade off underwriting (investment) 
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risk against investment (underwriting) risk reported in Hammond et al. (1976). Our results that 
are robust to various estimations, however, provide some support for Achleitner et al.’s (2002) 
conjecture that the insurance industry may have overlooked the correlation between underwriting 
and investment risks and largely managed investment in isolation from underwriting. This silo 
approach can then lead to the assumption of excessive risk relating to the same source (e.g., 
aviation industry risk) by many P-L insurers. Our study serves as the first systematic 
investigation of the interrelations between P-L insurers’ underwriting and investment risks and 
lays a ground for future work, especially those examining how the 9-11 event affects such 
interrelations afterwards. In the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, risk taking and risk 
management of financial institutions have received more attention and increasing scrutiny. We 
believe the current paper provides some useful insights in this vein. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the linkage between the 
underwriting risk and investment risk of P-L insurers. Section 3 introduces the empirical models 
and variable measurement.  Section 4 describes our sample and Section 5 presents the results. 
The paper is concluded in Section 6. 
 
2. Hypotheses development: the linkage between underwriting and investment risks 
While there are other risks (e.g., credit risk) facing insurers, we only focus on 
underwriting risk and investment risk in the current study because their linkage represents an 
important, but under-researched area. Baranoff and Sager (2002) using life insurers as an 
example also opine that the management of the underwriting and investment risks is the major 
aspect of an insurer’s operation. Traditionally, underwriting is regarded as the primary activity in 
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which an insurer has core competence. In underwriting, insurers take on risks in exchange for 
premiums. The difference between earned premiums and the sum of claims and expenses 
represents insurers’ underwriting profit. Underwriting risk arises when actual insurance claims 
and expenses incurred deviate from the expected values that determine the premium level, 
thereby leading to the fluctuation of underwriting profit. On the other hand, insurers need to set 
up various kinds of reserves (e.g., unearned premium and loss reserves) to fulfill future policy 
liabilities. The time difference between receiving premiums and paying claims enables insurers 
to invest most of the premiums together with their surplus into various assets (e.g., bonds and 
stocks) whose risk may also affect insurers’ underwriting activities. Several authors (e.g., 
Hammond et al., 1976; Hammond and Shilling, 1978; Moridaira, Urrutia and Witt, 1992) argue 
that investment return is the most important component of P-L insurers’ profit because the 
underwriting profit of P-L insurers are often negative. Hoyt and Trieschmann (1991) also report 
that P-L insurers tend to invest a greater share of their assets in stocks than do their life 
counterparts. While such a heavier investment bet on stock market can bring a higher return for 
P-L insurers, it also means a higher risk borne by P-L insurers in investment.  
As suggested by Fairley (1979), expected earnings to be realized at the end of a policy 
year consist of the underwriting profit margin and investment returns. Their relation can be 
formulated as  
spksrr AE ++= )1(    (1)  
where Er  = expected return on equity
6 
                                                 
6 Empirical study by Lee and Cummins (1998) shows that the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) and Wei's unified 
CAPM/APT (1988) models perform better than the CAPM in estimating the cost of equity capital for the PC 
insurers. 
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           Ar  = expected investment yield  
          =k  average amount of investable funds created by the cash flow per dollar of annual 
premium  
         s = premium-to-capital ratio 
        p  = underwriting margin 
Equation (1) specifically indicates that P-L insurers are facing a dual risk exposure to two 
core risks, namely, underwriting and investment risks, which simultaneously affect insurers’ 
insolvency risk and thereby their corporate value. In order to achieve the target level of expected 
returns, P-L insurers are likely to set a target overall risk level to maximize their firm value. 
Based on equation (1), the adjustment process of determining the target risk level relies on the 
dynamic adjustment processes of underwriting and investment risks. Indeed, Hammond et al. 
(1976) and Hammond and Shilling (1978) argue that P-L insurers’ underwriting and investment 
risks are not independent and insurance managers may control the overall insolvency risk by 
trading off one core risk against the other.  
Insurers may adjust investment risk according to their underwriting risk. This is because 
the combination of business-line underwritten by an insurer affects the composition and liquidity 
of its investment portfolio under an asset-liability duration matching strategy. For example, 
insurers underwriting highly volatile business lines may require a high degree of investment 
liquidity and a low level of investment volatility (e.g., via implementing a more conservative 
investment policy) in order to meet future policy liabilities. It may be desirable for insurers to 
achieve their target overall level of risk by adjusting investment risk according to underwriting 
risk (Hammond et al., 1976; Achleitner et al., 2002) because of two reasons. One, regulations on 
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rate-setting in the P-L insurance industry are more stringent compared to those on investments in 
the U.S. and thus insurers could be constrained in promptly adjusting their underwriting risk 
through changing premium rates. On the other hand, when capital is inadequate relative to 
liabilities, P-L insurers in principle can choose to scale down their liability side (i.e., 
underwriting less business, switching to less risky businesses or changing underwriting criteria). 
However, this is an inflexible and potentially costly solution given its adverse impacts on 
customers and potential damage to long-term client relationships (e.g., see Lee and Forbes, 1982; 
Harrington and Niehaus, 2002).    
The level of investment risk may in turn induce managers to modify its underwriting 
policy accordingly in order to keep total risk in check. For instance, a P-L insurer with a high 
investment risk but find it costly (e.g., due to market imperfections) and/or difficult to adjust 
(e.g., at the time of a severe market downturn) may have to adopt a more stringent underwriting 
criteria in order to limit the total risk. Therefore, the above reasoning suggests a trade-off 
hypothesis as follows: 
H1: Other things being equal, there is likely a negative relation between a P-L 
insurer’s underwriting risk and investment risk. 
 
Second, as P-L insurers tend to rely heavily on investment income as the profit source 
(Hammond and Shilling, 1978; Hoyt and Trieschmann, 1991), a high investment risk is likely to 
result in a more volatile surplus and underwriting capacity. As a result, it can consequently 
increase (decrease) the fluctuation in insurance rates and thereby the volatility of underwriting 
profit if internally retained earnings is an important source of P-L insurers’ capital. This is 
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possible as it is a common practice for regulators and insurers to restrict underwriting capacity 
up to certain multiples of surplus (Smith, 2001).7 This reasoning suggests a positive correlation 
between a P-L insurer’s underwriting and investment risks. We thus formulate an alterative 
hypothesis (i.e., the co-movement hypothesis) on the linkage between the underwriting and 
investment risks of a P-L insurer. The co-movement is reinforced if an insurer fails to trade off 
underwriting (investment) risk against investment (underwriting) risk and is subject to dual 
exposures to the same source of risks on both underwriting and investment. If so, a catastrophic 
event can trigger the simultaneous loss in both aspects (Achleitner et al., 2002). 8 
Correspondingly, we develop the alternative hypothesis as follows: 
H2: Other things being equal, there is likely a positive relation between a P-L insurer’s 
underwriting risk and investment risk. 
 
The relation between insurers’ underwriting and investment risks may vary according to 
insurers’ overall risk capacity that can be measured by the capital level of an insurer given its 
underwriting liabilities. For example, when an insurer’s overall risk is still low and has extra 
capacity to take more risk, it may simultaneously increase both underwriting and investment 
risks in order to achieve an optimal level of overall risk. In contrast, if an insurer is approaching 
the regulatory limit in capital level, it may choose to trade off one risk against the other.  Indeed, 
Cummins and Sommer (1996, p. 1071) also argue that “… adequately capitalized insurers should 
                                                 
7 For example, the famous Kenney rule argues that the ratio of premiums to surplus for a P-L insurer should not 
exceed 2. In recent years, there is a declining trend in Kenney ratio in the U.S. P-L industry probably reflecting that 
insurers leave more financial slack for catastrophes (Cummins and Doherty, 2002). For example, Smith (2001) 
reports that over the period 1994-1999, the industry average for U.S. P-L insurers was in the range of 0.84-1.3. 
While the mean Kenney ratio of our sample is 1.12. 
8 For example, in the September 11th attack of the World Trade Center (WTC), if an insurer provided coverage 
to the WTC, but also held a lot of aviation and insurance shares, both its underwriting and investment losses can be 
substantial. 
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be permitted to operate without restrictions on their asset and liability portfolio choices, such as 
stronger rules to control investment risk.” This leads to our third hypothesis:  
 
H3: Other things being equal, the relation between a P-L insurer’s underwriting risk and 
investment risk is likely to vary according to an insurer’s overall risk capacity.  
 
It should be pointed out that H1 and H2 may not be mutually exclusive; instead, both 
mechanisms could be at work and contribute to the relation between a P-L insurer’s underwriting 
and investment risks. The observed result from our tests may only reflect the dominating effect. 
Moreover, H3 serves to investigate the relations between the two core risks conditional on the 
insurers’ risk capacity (measured by the level of Kenney ratio).  
 
3. Empirical models and variables 
3.1 Models 
Following Cummins and Sommer (1996), Baranoff and Sager (2002), we adopt a system 
of simultaneous equations incorporating partial adjustment to examine the risk-taking behaviors 
of insurers. Incorporating partial adjustment is necessary because adjustments in underwriting 
and investment risks may not be completed within one accounting period due to market 
imperfections, information asymmetries and/or delays in claims handling. 
Changes in the underwriting (investment) risk of a P-L insurer can be written as: 
  ∆URi,t  =  ∆URi,t D    + εi,t         (2) 
  ∆IRi,t  =  ∆IRi,t D    + vi,t         (3) 
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where ∆URi,t (∆IRi,t) is the change in underwriting (investment) risk of insurer i from time t–1 to 
t and ∆URi,tD (∆IRi,tD) is the endogenously determined underwriting (investment) risk adjustment 
from t–1 to t. In the partial adjustment model, variations in current underwriting (investment) 
risk are assumed to be proportional to the difference between the insurer’s current period 
expectations of underwriting (investment) risk and their actual amounts at the end of the previous 
year, i.e., 
  ∆URi,t   =  γ1 [URi,t*    - URi, t - 1]  +  εi,t       (4) 
  ∆IRi,t   =  γ2 [IRi,t*    - IRi, t - 1]  +  vi,t                   (5) 
 
where URi,t* (IRi,t*) is insurer i’s expected level of underwriting (investment) risk at time t and γ1 
and γ2 are adjustment coefficients. To complete the model, one can determine the target 
underwriting (investment) risk of firm i from equations (6) and (7): 
URi,t*  = a0+a1IRi,t+∑
=
k
j
jij Xa
2
, +μi,t                                              (6) 
IRi,t*  = b0+b1URi,t+∑
=
k
j
jij Xb
2
, +Φi,t                                                                  (7) 
Xj is an array of control variables of underwriting and investment risks (to be discussed in 
Section 3.3). Substituting equations (6) and (7) into equations (4) and (5), respectively, gives the 
following risk equations to be estimated: 
URi,t =α1+β0URi,t-1+β1IRi,t+∑
=
k
j
jijX
2
,β  +ξi,t                                                  (8) 
IRi,t =α2+δ0IRi,t-1+δ1URi,t+∑
=
k
j
jijX
2
,δ  +ωi,t                                                       (9) 
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In equation (8), α1 = γ1a0, β0 = (1 – γ1), βj = γ1aj  (j = 1 to k), and ξi,t  = γ1μi,t + εi,t 
In equation (9), α2 = γ2b0,δ0 = (1 – γ2),δj = γ2bj  (j = 1 to k), and ωi,t  = γ2Φi,t + vi,t.  ξi,t  
and ωi,t  are error terms in the model.  
 
3.2. Measurement of underwriting and investment risks 
Investment risk (IR) is measured by the amount of investment in common stocks scaled 
by the firm’s cash and other investable funds, which has been used in several prior studies (e.g., 
Harrington and Nelson, 1986; Pottier and Sommer, 1999).9  In terms of underwriting risk (UR), 
we use combined ratio defined as the sum of loss ratio and expense ratio as a measure of 
underwriting risk in this study.  A higher combined ratio implies a higher underwriting risk. This 
UR measure captures underwriting expenses, which are not taken into consideration in Adams 
and Buckle (2003) that use loss ratio as a measure of underwriting risk. Lamm-Tennant and 
Starks (1993) measure underwriting risk (UR) as the standard deviation of a firm’s loss ratios 
over a five-year time period in comparing the underwriting risk of stock and mutual insurers. 
This measure has little annual variations and does not correspond to the measurement period of 
investment risk, and it is therefore deemed inappropriate for our study, as we intend to examine 
the interactions between insurers’ underwriting and investment risks on an annual basis.  
 
3.3. Control variables 
                                                 
9 We do not have access to the details of the investment mix of insurers and by-class return data and hence 
cannot use a measure reflecting the financial market risk of different asset classes. Nevertheless, in Section 5.3, we 
also test the sensitivity of our results using an alternative proxy of investment risk that is defined as the proportion of 
investment in common stocks, preferred stocks, and long-term low-grade bonds (i.e., class-3 to class-6 bonds with a 
maturity over 5 years).  
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 We control for the following exogenous factors that may affect an insurer’s 
underwriting/investment risks.  Table 1 provides detailed definitions of these variables. Below 
we briefly discuss the effects of these variables on an insurer’s underwriting/investment risks. 
Firm size and Age: As in Cummins and Sommer (1996) and Baranoff and Sager 
(2002), firm size is included to control for the difference in risk, capital and growth opportunities 
among different-sized insurers. Hardwick (1997) also argues that large insurers are likely to 
perform better and so may have higher risk capacity than small insurers because of economies of 
scale. Age is also included to provide a further control for cross-sectional differences in growth 
opportunities and the expertise in underwriting and investment. On the one hand, large and 
mature firms may have less growth opportunities, more experience, and/or more capital and 
thereby being less risky (Smith and Watts, 1992); on the other hand, such firms may have more 
capital and hence a stronger ability to bear a higher risk (Cummins and Sommer, 1996; Baranoff 
and Sager, 2002). Therefore, the literature does not provide an unambiguous prediction of the 
effects of size and age on insurers’ risks (including both underwriting and investment risks).  
Capital ratio:  According to the risk-based capital regulation in the U.S., an 
insurer should have a capital level commensurate with its risk level. This suggests that an insurer 
should consider its availability of capital and surplus in deciding on its underwriting and 
investment risks. Indeed, Cummins and Sommer (1996) report a positive relation between a P-L 
insurer’s capital and an aggregate risk proxy reflecting both underwriting and investment risks. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Cummins and Sommer 1996; Colquitt, Sommer and Godwin, 
1999), we define a firm’s capital ratio as the ratio of total surplus to total book value of assets. 
We expect the coefficient of capital ratio to be a positive sign in both underwriting and 
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investment risk equations.  In order to mitigate the potential endogeneity between 
underwriting/investment risk and capital ratio, we lag capital ratio by one period. 
 Business-line mix:  P-L insurers with a high level of business concentration 
tend to have a higher level of underwriting risk than firms with diversified sources of premium 
income. Following Mayers and Smith (1994), we use a business-line Herfindahl index as an 
indicator of business-line concentration. The Herfindahl index is calculated as 
n
2
L
L 1
HI S
=
=∑ , where 
L LS PI / TPI=  indicates the ratio of the amount of net premiums written in a particular line of 
business (PIL) over the total amount of net premiums written in all lines (TPI). Additionally, 
following Sommer (1996) and Pottier and Sommer (1999), we include the proportion of net 
premiums derived from long-tail liability business as another control variable. The rationale is 
that firms with a higher proportion of long-tail business may exhibit a higher underwriting risk. 
If insurers trade off underwriting risk and investment risk, an insurer with a higher index of 
business-line concentration and a larger percentage of long-tail liability business is more likely to 
pursue a conservative investment strategy.  
Organizational form: The insurance industry is characterized by the diversity of 
organizational forms – shareholder-owned stock insurers, and policyholder-owned mutual 
insurers (Adams, 1999). In their well-known managerial discretion hypothesis, Mayers and 
Smith (1981, 1994) argue that by integrating the owner-policyholder functions, mutuals are more 
efficient than their stock counterparts in controlling shareholder-policyholder agency conflicts, 
but are less effective in controlling owner-manager incentive conflicts. Therefore, they predict 
that mutual P-L insurers will be mainly pronounced in simple and less diverse business lines and 
less geographical areas in order to limit managerial discretion. Indeed, Lamm-Tennant and 
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Starks (1993) find that stock insurers tend to have a higher level of underwriting risk than do 
mutuals. Additionally, Cummins and Sommer (1996) argue that the risk-taking of a firm should 
be inversely related to the degree of separation of ownership from management. This is because 
the more separation of ownership from management, the greater misalignment between the 
interests of managers and owners. As a result, such managers might be more concerned about 
their own job security and so engage in less risk taking.10 Moreover, Zou, Yang, Wang and Zhu 
(2008) provide evidence supporting that mutual insurers are more likely to face capital 
constraints and suffer from agency costs of equity, thereby adopting a more conservative 
dividend policy than stock insurers do. Compared with stock insurers, mutuals tend to have a 
higher degree of separation of ownership and management and therefore they are more likely to 
have a lower underwriting and/or investment risk than do stock firms (e.g., see Baranoff and 
Sager, 2002). We therefore include a dummy variable (1 for a stock insurer) in our model and 
expect it to have a positive sign in the models of underwriting and investment risks. 
Group status:   Whether an insurer is an independent firm or a member of a 
group is likely to be important when firm managers choose the levels of underwriting and 
investment risks. Intuitively, affiliated insurers are exposed to less capital constraints because of 
the possible funding help from other associated firms within the group and therefore may afford 
to bear more risks (i.e., having a larger risk capacity) (Cummins and Sommer, 1996). Consistent 
with this argument, Colquitt et al. (1999) find that an affiliated P-L firm generally holds less cash 
than an independent firm. A dummy variable with value 1 indicating a group-affiliated firm is 
included and a positive sign is expected in the models of underwriting and investment risks.   
                                                 
10 This is because, unlike shareholders, company managers are often inefficient in diversifying their personal 
wealth outside the company (Mayers and Smith, 1981). 
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Franchise value: Franchise value, sometimes referred to as intangible assets (e.g., 
name, reputation, agency force in place, licensing agreements), is particularly important to 
financial institutions including insurers (Pottier and Sommer, 1999). Keeley (1990), Demestz et 
al. (1996) and Saunders and Wilson (2001) contend that a bank’s existing franchise value 
provides managers disincentives for excessive risk-taking. Consistent with this view, Staking and 
Babbel (1995) report a negative relationship between an insurer’s interest rate risk exposure and 
its franchise value. Following Pottier and Sommer (1999), we use A.M. Best’s financial strength 
rating to measure an insurer’s franchise value.11  Our numeric coding defines a lower value of 
rating as better financial strength and a higher franchise value and such firms are expected to 
engage in less risk-taking. In other words, we expect the rating variable to have a positive sign in 
the risk models. On the other hand, as rating can represent the financial strength of insurers, it is 
likely that there is a positive relationship between the rating measure and an insurer’s 
underwriting and investment risks.  In order to mitigate the potential endogeneity between 
underwriting/investment risk and rating, we use an insurer’s rating in the previous year in the 
analysis. 
Regulation:  Prior studies (e.g., Cummins and Sommer, 1996; Sommer, 1996) 
report that New York state has a more stringent licensing and solvency regulation than do other 
states. Therefore, other things being equal, it is possible that insurers operating in New York may 
have a lower level of overall risk tolerance than insurers operating outside New York State. This 
factor may also have an effect on insurers’ underwriting and investment risks though the 
                                                 
11 Specifically, we define franchise value (FV)=1 if the Best rating is A++ or A+; FV=2 if the rating is A or A-; 
FV=3 if the rating is B++ or B+; FV=4 if the rating is B or B-; FV=5 if the rating is C++ or C+; and FV=6 if the 
rating is C, C-, or D. We also exclude the insurers without rating (codes 88 or 99) or with rating under the regulatory 
supervision, or in liquidation, or with rating suspended. 
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direction of such influence is not known as a priori. We include the proportion of gross premium 
written from New York State to control for such a possibility.  
Distribution channel: Cummins and Sommer (1996) argue that insurers relying 
on independent agents to sell policies can take on a higher risk because such agents have little 
human capital specific to a particular insurer. We therefore include a dummy variable that takes 
one for independent agents and zero otherwise. 
Volatility of financial markets:  The volatility of financial markets may affect 
insurers’ investment strategy and increase their investment risk. In addition to investing in bonds 
and stocks, insurance companies may also use financial derivatives (Cummins et al., 2001; De 
Ceuster, Flanagan, Hodgson, and Tahir, 2003). If insurers trade off investment risk against 
underwriting risk, the volatility of financial market may also potentially affect underwriting risk. 
Following Cummins and Sommer (1996), we include the annual volatility change in bond and 
S&P 500 index return in the models to capture the effects of market volatility. 
Operating scope: Finally, we control for the effects of operating scope by including a 
dummy variable with value one indicating national insurers and zero otherwise. Operating scope 
may affect an insurer’s underwriting risk (e.g., through geographical and business-line 
diversification) and may potentially affect its investment risk if an insurer makes joint decisions 
the two core risks. 
We also include year dummies in models to control for time-related factors (e.g., 
underwriting cycles, the occurrence of catastrophes, etc.).  
 
4. Data  
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Our original dataset is from the regulatory annual statements filed by P-L insurers with 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for the period 1993 through 
2000to us, while our analysis is for the sample period 1994 to 2000.12 Starting from 1994 is 
necessary as the risk-based capital (RBC) system was implemented in that year, which may 
cause structural changes in insurers’ capital and risk-taking decisions.  The terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001 caused U.S. insurers to pay billions of dollars in damages and induced 
significant rate hikes following the attack and as a result, the event has the potential to change 
the relation between investment risk and underwriting risk. It would be interesting to examine 
whether this is indeed the case. However, this examination is not possible in the current study 
because we do not have access to data beyond 2001. The focus on the relation between 
investment risk and underwriting risk before 2001 is a limitation of our study, and we leave the 
impact of this catastrophic loss event as a topic of future research. Nevertheless, we feel that the 
results from our study can be usefully compared against future research using more updated data. 
In common with prior studies (e.g., Sommer, 1996; Cummins, Phillips and Smith, 2001), 
a firm to be included in the sample needs to satisfy the following criteria: a) with consistently 
positive asset and surplus values over the 1993-2000 period; b) with positive net premium 
written between 1993 and 2000; c) being either a stock or a mutual firm during the sample period 
in order to avoid the confounding effects of organizational changes on risk taking behavior; d) 
with available information for the variables used in the analysis. Reciprocals and Lloyds 
                                                 
12 The inclusion of year 1993 data is to extract the lag values in some variables.  
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Syndicates are excluded as they are deemed to be outside the scope of the current study. Our 
selection criteria result in a final sample of 581 firms and 3,523 year-firm observations.13  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive and univariate results 
 
 Table 1 provides the definition of each variable included in the analysis and Table 2 
presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. Where necessary, 
variables are winsorized at the 1% level at the left and/or right tail to eliminate the effects of 
extreme values. The mean combined ratio of our sample firms is at an average value of 105% 
suggesting an unfavorable underwriting performance and this may motivate P-L insurers to 
further enhance their overall return via investment. The mean value of investment risk is 0.208 
suggesting that our sample firms on average invest about 21% of their investable assets in 
common stocks. The alternative measure of investment risk is defined as the percentage of 
investment in common stocks, preferred stocks and long-term low-grade bonds (with a maturity 
over five years). The ratio of this risky asset allocation is about 42%.  The sample firms have an 
operation history about 69 years and have a mean capital ratio of 42%. In addition, 63% of the 
sample firms are stock insurers and 78% of the sample firms are affiliated to a group. In terms of 
the underwriting activities, the sample firms underwrite a significant proportion of long-tail lines 
of businesses, which contributes about 67% to the total net premium. 14  Moreover, about 80% of 
insurers rely on independent agencies as the distribution channel and about 17% of insurers 
operate nationally. These statistics are similar to those reported in Cummins and Sommer (1996). 
                                                 
13 The panel data is unbalanced and Stata – the statistical software that we use – can conveniently handle the 
related estimation issue of unbalanced panel datasets internally.  
14 Among the total 35 underwritten insurance lines, 13 of them are long-tail insurance and have generated 
significant amount of premium income.   
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We also calculate a correlation coefficient between underwriting and investment risks and the 
computed Pearson correlation coefficient (unreported for brevity) is not statistically significant. 
Therefore, the univariate analysis provides no evidence supporting that insurers trade off one 
core risk against the other.  
[Insert Table 1 & 2 here] 
 
5.2   Multivariate results 
To capture the interactions between UR and IR for P-L insurers, we estimate a system of 
simultaneous equations (Equations (8) and (9)) and follow the standard methodology to examine 
the model identification. Following the order condition rule, in both equations, the number of 
(endogenous and exogenous) variables missing from each equation is equal to 1 (the total 
number of endogenous variables 2 minus 1) (see Kennedy, 1998, p.171). Therefore, each 
equation and hence the system is exactly identified. Prior studies (e.g., Cummins and Sommer, 
1996; Baranoff and Sager, 2002) document that autocorrelated error terms are common in the 
specification of insurers’ risk profile. This is an issue since our sample is a panel dataset. We 
therefore estimate the system of simultaneous equations using the two-stage least square (2SLS) 
procedure with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm level to allow for 
within-firm autocorrelation. In the first stage, the endogenous variables (UR and IR) are 
instrumented by their respective lagged values and the control variables used in the system.   
 
5.2.1 Basic results  
21 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results based on simultaneous equations model. The control 
variable of financial market volatility is measured by either volatility change in S&P index or 
volatility change in bond return.15 In particular, Columns [1] and [2] of Table 3 report the results 
of the model including the volatility change in S&P index as a proxy for financial market 
volatility, whereas Columns [3] and [4] demonstrate the results of the model including the 
volatility change in bond return as a proxy. The results are similar in the two sets of analysis and 
our discussions focus on Columns [1] and [2].  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Consistent with the co-movement hypothesis (H2), IR and UR are positively correlated, 
but insignificant at the 10% level).  Therefore, there is no significant evidence in support of the 
co-movement hypothesis nor the trade-off hypothesis. Instead, it seems that insurers do not 
consider underwriting risk and investment risk as a joint decision.  
 As expected, the coefficients of lagged UR and lagged IR are found to be positive and 
significant at the 1% level in the model of UR and IR, respectively. The coefficient value 0.554 
of the lagged UR in the IR equation suggests that the partial adjustment speed, defined as 1-the 
coefficient of lagged UR, is about 44.6%. In addition, the partial adjustment speed of IR is 4.8%. 
The results suggest that on average it takes insurers about two years to adjust to their target level 
of underwriting risk, where it takes a longer time period to adjust to the target level of investment 
risk. The latter result is surprising as the cost of adjusting investment portfolio in theory should 
be lower than adjusting the underwriting portfolio. Nevertheless, using a large sample for the 
period 1996-2008, Chen, Sun, Yao and Yu (2010) also find that P-L insurers are slower in 
                                                 
15 If we include them simultaneously in the models, none of their coefficient estimate is statistically significant 
(these two variables have a correlation coefficient of 0.52). 
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adjusting investment risk measured by the duration of the bond portfolio held by an insurer (they 
report an adjustment speed of 24%). While a detailed study of this phenomenon is beyond the 
scope of the current study, we conjecture that the inconsistency between expectation and 
empirical evidence can be due to the short-term feature of P-L insurance contracts. P-L insurance 
contracts are often valid for one year and renewable afterwards and this provides insurers an 
opportunity to adjust their underwriting risk within one or two years. In addition, compared to 
other investment vehicles, investment in common stock is more risky. Thus, if an insurer adopts 
a long-term investment strategy with a carefully chosen stock portfolio and uses the fund from a 
stable source (e.g., retained earnings) in such risky investment, a low adjustment speed in 
investment risk is possible.  
 Among the control variables, the results suggest that insurers with a poor financial 
strength rating and/or with more long-tail business tend to have a higher underwriting risk than 
other firms. The result on financial strength rating confirms that insurers with good financial 
strength rating tend to take less underwriting risk in order to protect their franchise value. In 
addition, insurers that are large, have a higher capital ratio or less business written in New York 
tend to invest more of their assets in risky common stocks.  The finding on capital ratio implies 
that insurers with a high level of capital adequacy opt to bear more investment risks, which is 
consistent with that of Cummins and Sommer (1996). The coefficient of the stock dummy is 
unexpectedly negative and significant in the model of IR, suggesting that mutual insurers tend to 
adopt a more aggressive investment strategy.  Volatility change in S&P index is found to have a 
positive effect on investment risk, whereas a negative effect on underwriting risk. In Columns [3] 
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and [4], we replace volatility change in S&P index with volatility change in bond return and find 
similar results.  
 Table 3 also reports two diagnostic checks on the validity of instruments for UR and IR. 
The F-tests of the excluded instrument (lagged UR for UR and lagged IR for IR) are always 
highly significant (p-values lower than 0.01). More illustrative than these standard F-tests are 
Shea’s (1997) partial R2 that all well exceed the suggested (“rule of thumb”) hurdle of 10%. 
Therefore, the instruments are valid and there is no weak identification problem.16 
  
5.2.2 Underwriting-investment-risk relation and risk capacity  
 As discussed in Section 2, the relation between insurers’ underwriting and investment 
risks may vary according to insurers’ overall risk capacity. For example, when an insurer’s 
overall risk is low and has extra risk capacity, it may simultaneously increase both risks; in 
contrast, if an insurer’s risk is approaching the regulatory limit, it may choose to trade off one 
risk against the other. In order to test for this possibility, we partition our sample into two 
subsamples according to whether the value of Kenney ratio is over 2 or not. Kenney ratio, 
defined as the ratio of net premiums written to capital, has been traditionally viewed as a key 
underwriting capacity and insolvency ratio (as net premiums written are a rough proxy of future 
liabilities). As a rule of thumb, it is generally believed that the Kenney ratio of an insurer should 
not exceed 2 in order to keep insolvency risk in check.  The regression results are reported in 
Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
                                                 
16 We cannot use Sargan/Hansen test to examine whether the instrument is correlated with the error term of the 
model since our system of simultaneous equations is exactly identified. 
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 First, the results reported under the Columns “Kenney Ratio ≥2” show that UR is 
negatively related to IR among insurers that have little extra risk capacity, albeit the coefficient 
of IR is insignificant. The coefficient estimate of UR is positive and insignificant in the IR model. 
We then turn to the results from using the subsample with a Kenney ratio<2 (reported in 
Columns [3] and [4]). The coefficient of IR (UR) is positive but significant in the UR (IR) model, 
These results suggest that regardless of the risk capacity, insurers do not seem to consider 
underwriting and investment risks jointly and so we find support for neither the co-movement 
nor the trade-off hypothesis. In the rest of models, we replace volatility change in S&P index 
with volatility change in bond return, and find similar results. 
 
5.3 Robustness checks 
In this section, we conduct several robustness checks to examine the sensitivity of our 
results. First, we estimate the system of simultaneous equations in three alternative ways: (1) 
2SLS estimation with Newey-West standard errors that are robust to unknown heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation; (2) 2SLS estimation incorporating random-effects; and (3) the full-
information three-stage least square (3SLS).17 The regression results on UR and IR are tabulated 
under Panels A, B and C of Table 5. It is apparent that the tenor of our results is robust with 
these alternative estimations – i.e., there is no significant evidence suggesting insurers consider 
underwriting and investment risk jointly. In addition, the robustness check of the subsample 
analysis based on risk capacity is also conducted and does provide robust results.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
                                                 
17 Fixed-effects cannot be incorporated given that the stock dummy is time-invariant. 
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The following robustness test is based on the use of alternative measure for investment 
risk. Pottier and Sommer (1999) find that investment risk, measured by the proportion of junk 
bonds and common stocks scaled by the invested assets, is negatively related to firm rating. They 
suggest that an increased ratio of junk bonds and common stocks in invested assets represents a 
more risky investment portfolio. In this part, we use an alternative measure of investment risk 
(IR2) that includes the proportion of investments in common stocks, preferred stocks, and long-
term low-grade bonds (refer to Table 1 for detailed definition). We include investments in 
preferred stocks because such investments should be more risky than bond investments. As 
shown in Table 2, the mean proportion of investment in these risky assets is about 42%. Using 
this alternative measure for IR, we then repeat all the analyses summarized in Sections 5.2.1 and 
5.2.2. In unreported results, neither the coefficient of IR in the UR model nor the effect of UR in 
the IR model is found to be statistically significant in the pooled and split sample analysis.  
 
6. Conclusion   
Underwriting and investment are the two important business activities in the insurance 
industry. While the extant literature has investigated the relation between insurers’ overall risk 
and capital level (Cummins and Sommer, 1996), the difference in underwriting risk between 
stock and mutual insurers (Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 1993), and the asset risk, product risk and 
capital in the U.S. life insurers (Baranoff and Sager, 2002), there is little research examining the 
interrelation between underwriting and investment risks of P-L insurers. Our study attempts to 
investigate the linkage between the underwriting and investment risks in the P-L insurance 
industry for the sample period 1994-2000 under a simultaneous equations framework. Especially, 
26 
 
we intend to examine whether insurers jointly determine the level of their underwriting and 
investment risks prior to the 9-11 event.  
We posit two non-mutually exclusive arguments the co-movement and trade-off 
hypothesis. Measuring underwriting risk as the combined ratio and investment risk as the 
proportion of investments in common stocks, we find no significant support for either of the 
arguments. Our result is thus different from the finding that insurers tend to trade off 
underwriting (investment) risk against investment (underwriting) risk reported in Hammond et 
al. (1976). Our results, nevertheless, provide some support for Achleitner et al.’s (2002) 
conjecture that the insurance industry may have overlooked the correlation between underwriting 
and investment risks and largely managed investment in isolation from underwriting. This silo 
approach can then lead to the assumption of excessive risk relating to the same source (e.g., 
aviation industry risk) by many P-L insurers.  
Our paper serves as the first systematic investigation of the interrelation between P-L 
insurers’ underwriting and investment risks. Future studies should benefit from using a sample 
period post 9-11 event and examining the effect of September 11 terrorist attack on the 
interrelation between insurers’ underwriting and investment risks. In particular, it is of interest to 
see whether insurers adopt an integrated approach to considering their overall risks so that the 
catastrophe losses from multiple exposures can be mitigated after the 9-11 event. In the 
aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, risk taking and risk management of financial 
institutions have received more attention and increasing scrutiny. We believe the current paper 
provides some useful insights in this vein. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
 
 Variables Definition 
1 Underwriting risk (UR) Measured by an insurer’s loss ratio plus expense ratio (including 
underwriting expenses), i.e., the combined ratio. Winsorized at 1% 
on both tails.  
2 Investment risk (IR) The proportion of investment in common stock, measured as 
common stock holdings divided by an insurer’s cash and other 
investable funds. Winsorized at the top 1%. 
3 Investment risk 2 (IR2) The proportion of investment in common stock, preferred stock, and 
long-term low-grade bonds (i.e., class-3 to class-6 bonds with a 
maturity over 5 years). Winsorized at 1% on both tails.  
4 Firm size Measured by logarithm of total (admitted) assets 
5 Firm age Measured by the number of operation years since inception 
6 Lagged capital ratio Measured as the ratio of total capital (surplus) to total book value of 
assets, lagged by one year 
7 Stock firm dummy 1 for stock insurers and 0 for mutual insurers 
8 Group dummy 1 for firms affiliated to a group 
9 Lagged rating Proxy for franchise value and financial strength, measured by the 
A.M. Best rating, with low values for good ratings 
10 Business-line mix Computed as the sum of the squared fraction of net premium written 
in each of 26 lines of insurance and used to measure the 
concentration of insurance lines 
11 Business from New York The ratio of net premium written in New York State to total net 
premium 
12 Long-tail business The proportion of premiums from long-tail business to total net 
premium 
13  Independent agency 
dummy 
1 if an insurer relies on independent agencies to sell policies and 0 if 
otherwise 
14 Volatility change in S&P 
index 
Annualized standard deviation of monthly return for S&P 500 index 
in year t ÷ annualized standard deviation of monthly return for S&P 
500 index in year t-1 
15 Volatility change in bond 
return 
Annualized standard deviation of monthly return for two-year US 
Treasury-bills in year t ÷ annualized standard deviation of monthly 
return for two-year US Treasury-bills in year t-1 
16  National insurer dummy 1 for a national insurer and 0 for otherwise.   
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics (N=3523) 
  
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
Underwriting risk (UR) 1.050 1.036 0.190 0.116 2.603
Investment risk (IR) 0.208 0.162 0.176 0.000 0.841
Investment risk 2 (IR2) 0.415 0.348 0.291 0.000 0.980
Firm size 18.832 18.749 1.836 13.480 24.379
Firm age 69.058 57.000 43.956 12.000 209.000
Lagged capital ratio 0.419 0.374 0.182 0.080 0.989
Stock firm dummy 0.632 1.000 0.482 0.000 1.000
Group dummy 0.775 1.000 0.418 0.000 1.000
Lagged rating 2.886 2.000 8.797 1.000 99.000
Business-line mix 0.407 0.321 0.246 0.091 1.000
Business from New York 0.079 0.000 0.203 -0.126 1.002
Long-tail business 0.670 0.729 0.260 0.000 1.000
Independent agency dummy 0.793 1.000 0.406 0.000 1.000
Volatility change in S&P index 1.310 1.349 0.555 0.483 2.113
Volatility change in bond return 1.002 1.045 0.150 0.768 1.213
National insurer dummy 0.173 0.000 0.378 0.000 1.000
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Table 3: Multivariate results of simultaneous equation models   
Dependent variable UR IR UR IR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Investment risk (IR) 0.009  0.009  
 [0.312]  [0.330]  
Lagged investment risk  0.952***  0.952*** 
  [92.344]  [92.506] 
Underwriting risk (UR)  0.010  0.011 
  [1.004]  [1.059] 
Lagged underwriting risk 0.554***  0.554***  
 [12.004]  [11.964]  
Firm size 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 
 [0.165] [3.272] [0.203] [3.231] 
Firm age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.844] [-0.151] [0.863] [-0.175] 
Lagged capital ratio -0.031 0.037*** -0.030 0.036*** 
 [-0.866] [4.020] [-0.835] [3.981] 
Stock firm dummy 0.004 -0.004* 0.004 -0.004* 
 [0.517] [-1.721] [0.513] [-1.714] 
Group dummy -0.015 0.002 -0.015 0.002 
 [-1.455] [0.697] [-1.464] [0.715] 
Lagged rating 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.001 
 [2.134] [1.008] [2.176] [0.898] 
Business-line mix -0.023 0.002 -0.023 0.002 
 [-1.492] [0.512] [-1.504] [0.527] 
Business from New York -0.007 -0.012*** -0.007 -0.012*** 
 [-0.499] [-3.189] [-0.490] [-3.188] 
Long-tail business 0.052*** 0.007 0.052*** 0.007 
 [3.342] [1.637] [3.341] [1.637] 
Independent agency dummy 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.001 
 [1.057] [-0.151] [1.049] [-0.136] 
Volatility change in S&P index -0.014** 0.006***   
 [-2.131] [2.641]   
Volatility change in bond return   -0.044 0.022*** 
   [-1.543] [2.667] 
National insurer dummy 0.008 0.001 0.008 0.001 
 [1.206] [0.204] [1.242] [0.167] 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
F-test of the excluded IV (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Shea’s (1997) partial R2 0.848 0.289 0.847 0.286 
Adjusted R2 0.334 0.905 0.334 0.905 
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N 3523 3523 3523 3523 
This table reports the regression results of simultaneous equations. Columns [1] and [2] is the simultaneous system 
using Volatility change in S&P index to measure financial market volatility and Columns [3] and [4] is the system 
using Volatility change in bond return to measure market volatility. Reported in brackets are t-values computed using 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm level to allow for within-firm autocorrelation. ***, **, * 
denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). The F-test of the excluded instrument 
variable and the Shea’s (1997) all suggest the excluded instrument variable of the underwriting and investment risk is 
relevant and rule out the possibility of weak identification. All models include a constant and its coefficient estimates 
are omitted for brevity. 
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Table 4: Multivariate results of simultaneous equation models - split sample analysis 
 Kenney ratio>=2 Kenney ratio<2 Kenney ratio>=2 Kenney ratio<2 
Dependent variable UR IR UR IR UR IR UR IR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Investment risk (IR) -0.068  0.015  -0.063  0.015  
 [-1.502]  [0.500]  [-1.393]  [0.509]  
Lagged investment risk  0.896***  0.955***  0.896***  0.955*** 
  [18.813]  [91.571]  [18.902]  [91.652] 
Underwriting risk (UR)  0.014  0.010  0.018  0.011 
  [0.276]  [0.979]  [0.330]  [1.022] 
Lagged underwriting risk 0.574***  0.552***  0.571***  0.552***  
 [9.808]  [11.480]  [9.681]  [11.448]  
Firm size 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002*** 
 [0.368] [1.269] [0.118] [2.704] [0.325] [1.288] [0.150] [2.666] 
Firm age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.536] [-0.480] [0.747] [-0.049] [0.618] [-0.519] [0.756] [-0.061] 
Lagged capital ratio 0.005 0.044 -0.036 0.032*** 0.006 0.044 -0.035 0.031*** 
 [0.058] [1.141] [-0.867] [3.248] [0.071] [1.183] [-0.842] [3.205] 
Stock firm dummy 0.009 0.007 0.005 -0.005** 0.009 0.007 0.005 -0.005** 
 [0.676] [0.872] [0.470] [-1.999] [0.645] [0.871] [0.465] [-1.987] 
Group dummy 0.001 -0.006 -0.019 0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.019 0.002 
 [0.025] [-0.722] [-1.552] [0.946] [-0.062] [-0.690] [-1.545] [0.934] 
Lagged rating 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 
 [1.699] [-0.354] [1.890] [1.106] [1.821] [-0.413] [1.923] [1.016] 
Business-line mix -0.037 -0.020 -0.023 0.004 -0.035 -0.020 -0.023 0.004 
 [-1.457] [-1.318] [-1.368] [0.841] [-1.369] [-1.344] [-1.390] [0.869] 
Business from New York -0.025 -0.021*** -0.003 -0.013*** -0.025 -0.021*** -0.003 -0.013*** 
 [-1.108] [-2.774] [-0.153] [-2.764] [-1.090] [-2.786] [-0.148] [-2.764] 
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Long-tail business 0.024 0.030*** 0.056*** 0.003 0.024 0.030** 0.055*** 0.003 
 [0.812] [2.599] [3.153] [0.706] [0.837] [2.559] [3.149] [0.715] 
Independent agency dummy 0.020 -0.005 0.006 0.001 0.020 -0.005 0.006 0.001 
 [1.501] [-0.512] [0.722] [0.237] [1.561] [-0.501] [0.707] [0.260] 
Volatility change in S&P index -0.018 0.004 -0.014* 0.006**     
 [-1.430] [0.555] [-1.907] [2.445]     
Volatility change in bond return     -0.076 0.026 -0.041 0.022** 
     [-1.323] [0.726] [-1.333] [2.558] 
National insurer dummy -0.001 0.005 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.001 
 [-0.086] [0.484] [1.249] [-0.055] [0.033] [0.470] [1.266] [-0.073] 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
F-test of the excluded IV (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Shea’s (1997) partial R2 0.748 0.305 0.853 0.284 0.750 0.300 0.853 0.284 
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.779 0.331 0.908 0.387 0.779 0.331 0.908 
N 468 468 3055 3055 468 468 3055 3055 
This table reports the regression results of simultaneous equations for firm-years with Kenney ratio above or below 2. Reported in brackets are t-values computed 
using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm level to allow for within-firm autocorrelation. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively (two-tailed). The F-test of the excluded instrument variable and the Shea’s (1997) all suggest the excluded instrument variable of the 
underwriting and investment risk is relevant and rule out the possibility of weak identification. All models include a constant and its coefficient estimates are 
omitted for brevity. 
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Table 5: Robustness checks: summary of results from alternative estimations of the 
simultaneous equation models  
 
Panel A: Newey-West estimator that is robust to unknown heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
 Pooled Kenney Ratio>=2 Kenney Ratio<2 
Dependent variable UR IR UR IR UR IR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Investment risk (IR) 0.009  -0.068  0.015  
 [0.424]  [-1.458]  [0.668]  
Underwriting risk (UR)  0.010  0.014  0.010 
  [1.110]  [0.348]  [1.063] 
Bandwidth of 3 is used in estimation 
 
Panel B: instrument variable using random-effects panel model 
 Pooled Kenney Ratio >=2 Kenney Ratio <2 
Dependent variable UR IR UR IR UR IR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Investment risk (IR) 0.009  -0.047  0.015  
 [0.420]  [-0.704]  [0.661]  
Underwriting risk (UR)  0.010  0.026  0.011 
  [1.040]  [0.453]  [1.010] 
 
Panel C: three-stage least square estimation 
 Pooled Kenney Ratio >=2 Kenney Ratio <2 
Dependent variable UR IR UR IR UR IR 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Investment risk (IR) 0.009  -0.068  0.014  
 [0.420]  [-1.470]  [0.660]  
Underwriting risk (UR)  0.010  0.014  0.010 
  [1.120]  [0.350]  [0.280] 
This table reports the regression results of alternative estimations of the simultaneous equations. Results are based 
on models controlling for the volatility change in S&P 500 index return. 
 
 
